The Minnesota Supreme Court has granted our Petition for review of the dismissal of our lawsuit, Benda for Common-sense v. Anderson, 999 N.W.2d 893 (Minn. App. 2023). This means our request to scrutinize the usage of modems in the Minnesota election process is still intact. In a bit of an unusual twist, our case is on hold pending the outcome of another case under review by the Minnesota Supreme Court. Given this other case may impact the issue of subject-matter jurisdiction in our case, we are in a holding pattern until that final opinion is issued.
As the wheels of justice grind on, we are quickly ticking closer to the 2024 election with a known cyber-security threat looming over Minnesota’s election infrastructure. As reported in the Star Tribune, ten counties in Minnesota, including Rice County, use modems to transmit unofficial election results. Our lawsuit exposed that these early results are transmitted outside the official Secretary of State secure portal to their Election Reporting System (ERS) database. These early results are made available to the public, and “Various media outlets acquire the public results data from the Secretary’s website.”
Alarmingly, the federally funded Elections Infrastructure ISAC, recently issued a stern warning in its recent guide entitled the Essential Guide to Election Security. Within that guide is a section dedicated to the risks and threats of the very same unofficial election night reporting process used in Minnesota under scrutiny in our legal action. Excerpts from this report speak for themselves:
The systems used for reporting and publishing are likely networked, and, in many cases, have public facing websites or application program interfaces (APIs). The outputs are the unofficial election results, typically published on a website, often in multiple formats such as extensible markup language (XML), hypertext markup language (HTML), portable document format (PDF), and comma-separated values (CSV). There is likely a direct and persistent network connection between the published site and the internet, though the official record of the results may be kept on a system that is not persistently connected to the internet.
This guide continues:
…the consequences of an attack that would impact unofficial election results reporting and publishing could be significant, resulting in loss of confidence in the correctly reported election results when they are finally posted.
While there are seven separate areas of concern, one of the most significant risks identified in this guide is that election officials may not even be able to identify, let alone remedy any “improper changes” to the vote tally (emphasis added):
Difficulty associated with finding, and rolling back, improper changes found after the fact.
Another non-partisan organization, Free Speech for People, coordinated the issuance of a technical letter on the risks of wireless connectivity which advocates that modems in voting systems should be prohibited. As stated in that letter,
[wireless connectivity] profoundly weakens voting system security and will introduce very real opportunities to remotely attack election systems. Therefore, we strongly advise you to maintain a prohibition on wireless networking capability in the VVSG 2.0.
As I was quoted in the Star Tribune, “the “riskreward” of using modems at any point in the process “doesn’t add up.” “That [increased] risk profile isn’t outweighed by getting a few early results,” Despite these well-documented risks, local election officials and our Minnesota Secretary of State continue to utilize modems, even in machines with out-of-life Windows 7 software.
Minnesota has a specific statute that authorizes Court scrutiny and correction of any error relating to a duty concerning an election – Minn. Stat. §204B.44(a)(4). Given the continued usage of electronic voting machines in our elections, and the continually increasing risk of cyber-attacks, we should be able to count on the judicial system to intervene if/when such an attack occurs. Our government’s short-sighted position is that the scope of this statute does not apply to “fixing” problems with our election machines. If the ruling in our case is not reversed, our elections could be left in limbo with no court remedy to wrap up a voting tabulation process that is side-tracked by manipulation or electronic error.
As voting technology evolves, we must demand that those entrusted with implementing the voting process do so through an open and transparent process. The question of whether Minnesota courts have proper jurisdiction over these types of situations is a critical question that I look forward to arguing to the top court in Minnesota.
Windows 7 !? Microsoft has not released security updates for Windows 7 since Jan 14th 2020!! How on earth are they using that for anything, let alone election-related activities. That alone is unacceptable.
So happy to see you here ~ fighting! As Seth Keshel says, “We have nationwide Electyle Disfunction here. And those who are corrupt are setting up for 2024. Until the voting machines are destroyed we are at the mercy of those few who know how to game the system. They know that we know.”
Windows 7 !? Microsoft has not released security updates for Windows 7 since Jan 14th 2020!! How on earth are they using that for anything, let alone election-related activities. That alone is unacceptable.
So happy to see you here ~ fighting! As Seth Keshel says, “We have nationwide Electyle Disfunction here. And those who are corrupt are setting up for 2024. Until the voting machines are destroyed we are at the mercy of those few who know how to game the system. They know that we know.”